Our paper is the first study of what one might call "reverse mathematics of explicit fixpoints". We study two methods of constructing such fixpoints for formulas whose principal connective is the intuitionistic Lewis arrow . Our main motivation comes from metatheory of constructive arithmetic, but the systems in question allows several natural semantics. The first of these methods, inspired by de Jongh and Visser, turns out to yield a well-understood modal system iGL − a . The second one by de Jongh and Sambin, seemingly simpler, leads to a modal theory iA − ⊕ JS, which proves harder to axiomatize in an elegant way. Apart from showing that both theories are incomparable, we axiomatize their join and investigate several subtheories, whose axioms are obtained as fixpoints of simple formulas. We also show that both iGL − a and iA − ⊕ JS are extension stable, that is, their validity in the corresponding preservativity logic of a given arithmetical theory transfer to its finite extensions.
Introduction
Provability logic studies propositional and algebraic aspects of arithmetical theories, their provability predicates and reflection principles. Thanks to Solovay's arithmetical completeness result [Sol76] , we know that the provability predicate of Peano Arithmetic [Smo85, BS91, Boo93, Lin96, JdJ98,Šve00, AB04, HV14] yields precisely the famous system GL, also known as the (Gödel -)Löb logic, obtained from the minimal unimodal normal logic by adding the principle ( ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ. One of the most important facts about GL is that it allows definability of explicit fixpoints. That is, given any polynomial ϕ(p) where all occurrences of p are guarded by , one can use de Jongh-Sambin algorithm to compute a formula χ not involving p and GL ⊢ χ ↔ ϕ(χ); furthermore, χ thus computed is unique up to propositional equivalence (de Jongh, Sambin [Sam76] , Bernardi [Ber76] ). Actually, GL is obtained precisely as the smallest extension of K4 (i.e., the logic of the transitivity axiom ϕ → ϕ) in which guarded fixpoints are definable. This follows immediately from the fact that, by Löb's argument, Löb's principle is entailed by the presence of guarded fixed points in combination with the de Jongh-Sambin result.
This result encodes the algebraic content of the Löb Theorem and Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. The modal analysis gives us the conceptual resources to say that the consistency statement is the explicit form of the Gödel sentence. More mundanely, it can be seen as elimination of fixpoint operator. The original statement is restricted to guarded fixpoints, but one can indeed extend this classical result to elimination of positive fixpoints of ordinary µ-calculus [VB06, Vis05] and further beyond (see § 12). Given the Kripkean meaning of GL as the logic of Noetherian (conversely well-founded) transitive frames, such results in turn have found applications, e.g., in characterizing expressivity of XPath fragments [tCFL10, § 3.1]. The Sambin-de Jongh result has inspired Nakano's seminal work on modality for recursion [Nak00, § 7], [Nak01, § 5]. Last, but definitely not the least, it can be used to prove other metaresults about GL, such as the Beth definability property, as observed first by Maximova [Mak89, AHdJ98, Hoo01, IDJZ05] (cf. § 11).
What happens when we broaden the investigation beyond the classical base and unary provability ? Regarding the former restriction, already Sambin's 1976 paper [Sam76] noted that the fixpoint theorem works over intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC). Unfortunately, despite decades of efforts [Vis94, Iem01b, Iem01a, Vis08, AM14] , there is no known axiomatization of the provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic (HA) and related systems; it is a system much stronger than intuitionistic GL, including principles such as (¬¬ ϕ → ϕ) → ϕ underivable even in classical GL, as classically it implies ⊥ (cf. [LV18, §5.3] for more examples). The algebraic core of a weak theory can include powerful schemes refutable in a stronger theory enjoying a different provability predicate. This phenomenon is often caused, e.g., by the fact that the weaker theory is closed under some translation method, whereas the stronger one is not.
Allowing non-unary connectives opens up vast new landscapes, especially in the constructive setting. In our paper [LV18] , apart from providing a general framework of schematic logics [LV18, § 5.1], we have made the case for the constructive strict implication , also called the Lewis arrow. It allows defining ϕ as ⊤ ϕ. We list its arithmetical interpretations in § 4. The most important one in the study of metatheory of HA is provided by ∆-preservativity for a theory T , where ∆ is a class of sentences, most commonly taken to be Σ 
Our Contributions
The classical construction of explicit guarded fixed points proceeds in two stages. One first proves the result for formulas where the main connective is the modal operator and then one shows how to extend the result to all modalized formulas (and possibly beyond that). Our results directly concern the first step. See § 12 for a brief discussion of the second one.
We have two known paradigms for such a construction. First, there is the original de Jongh-Sambin construction (see § 7) as generalized by Smoryński [Smo85, Ch. 4] . Secondly, there is the construction given by de Jongh and Visser [dJV91] for the interpretability logic IL (see § 6). As it simplifies to the de Jongh-Sambin construction when one adds the principle W (see Figure 1) , it seemed the master construction. Our results show that de Jongh-Visser construction and the de Jongh-Sambin construction are mutually incomparable. The incomparability result also holds in the classical case.
Our paper is the first study of what one might call "reverse mathematic of explicit fixpoints". After discussing algebraic and Kripke semantics for extensions of iA − ( § 3), we investigate the effect of adding explicit schemes stating that a given method (de Jongh-Visser or de Jongh-Sambin) indeed yields fixpoints of formulas whose principal connective is . This, however, requires a significant prerequisite: we noted above that the validity of a scheme in the logic (algebraic core) of a given arithmetical theory ( § 4) does not need to transfer to the logic of some given finite extension. As we show in a companion paper [LV] , this holds if the base logic enjoys the property of extension stability. After recalling this information ( § 5), we show that the minimal theory in which the de Jongh-Visser construction works is the theory iGL − a ( § 6), which is extension stable. Thus, for the de Jongh-Visser construction we have a precise analogue of Löb's Logic. In § 7 we show that the case of the de Jongh-Sambin construction is more complex and show the incomparability of its theory (iA − ⊕ JS, which also turns out to be extension stable) with iGL − a . In § 8 we axiomatize the join of both theories. In § 9 we investigate several subtheories of iA − ⊕ JS, whose axioms are obtained as de Jongh-Sambin fixpoints of simple formulas. A large part of our results on axiomatizing explicit fixpoints is concisely summarized by Figure 2 therein. In § 10 we present Kripke semantics for some principles investigated in earlier sections and uncover a simple nonconservativity phenomenon.
Basics
Our basic system is iA − in the language of intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) extended with a binary connective . We write ϕ for ⊤ ϕ. The system is given by the following axioms:
prop axioms and rules for IPC
We take ϕ := ⊤ ϕ and ϕ for ϕ ∧ ϕ. One can easily derive the intuitionistic version of the classical system K (without ) for the -language from iA − . The system iA extends iA − with
A (iA − -)logic Λ is an extension of iA − that is closed under modus ponens, necessitation and substitution. Let X be a set of formulas. We write Λ ⊕ X for the closure of Λ ∪ X under modus ponens and necessitation. Note that Λ ⊕ X is not automatically a logic. On the other hand, if X is closed under substitution, then so is Λ ⊕ X.
Remark 2.1. All theorems we claim for iA − also hold when we omit disjunction from the language, in the sense that we still have all schemes, where the interpretations of the schematic letters are restricted to disjunction-free formulas. Our proofs also work in the disjunction-free setting.
Theorems 10.3 and 10.4 illustrate that Di is sometimes needed to derive principles not involving ∨. A similar example is provided by the trivialization of in iA ⊕ CPC [LV18, Lemma 4.6]. In the latter case, we know we need Di to make the argument work since the classical interpretability logic IL does not trivialize.
❍
At some points, we will use a convenient notation for substitution. Suppose a variable, say r, of substitution is given in the context. We will write ϕψ for ϕ[r := ψ]. We note that (ϕψ)χ is equal to ϕ(ψχ). So we may write ϕψχ.
Lemma 2.2. Let a designated variable of substitution r be given. We have:
Sub2 Suppose every occurrence of r is in the scope of an occurrence in χ. We have:
Proof. We prove Sub1 by induction on χ. The only interesting case is where χ = ν 0 ν 1 . By the Induction Hypothesis, for i = 0, 1, we have:
It follows that:
and, hence that:
The desired result is now immediate. We prove Sub2. Suppose χ = ν 0 ν 1 . We have, by Sub1,
Hence,
Ergo, since iA − ⊕ 4 ⊢ ϕ → ϕ, we find:
Thus the desired result follows for the case that χ = ν 0 ν 1 .The remaining cases are by induction on outer non-modal propositional connectives. ❑ Lemma 2.3. (Uniqueness of fixpoints) Fix a designated variable of substitution r. Suppose every occurrence of r is in the scope of an occurrence in χ. Suppose q does not occur in χ. We have:
Proof. We use the familiar fact that we have 4 in iA − ⊕ L . It is easy to see that we have the strengthened Löb's Rule in iA − ⊕ L , to wit:
We use this rule in our proof. We only prove (a), as items (b) and (c) follow then immediately. We reason in iA − ⊕ L . Suppose (r ↔ χr) and (q ↔ χq) and (r ↔ q). Since we have 4 , we also have Sub2 and, hence, χr ↔ χq. Thus we find r ↔ q. By the strengthened Löb's Rule, we may conclude r ↔ q without the assumption of (r ↔ q). ❑ 
Semantics
Most proofs in this paper are of purely syntactic nature. Nevertheless, we occasionally still need semantics, e.g., for non-derivability results and for better understanding of syntactic systems and notions studied below. For our purposes, it is enough to consider algebraic semantics ( § 3.1) and Kripke semantics ( § 3.2).
Algebraic Semantics
We briefly recapitulate algebraic semantics as discussed in our companion paper [LV] . A generic algebraic completeness result after the manner of Lindenbaum and Tarski is obtainable for almost any "natural" logic and extensions of iA − are no exception. We can in fact put it in a general setting: with their The "global consequence relation" of any extension of iA − including both Modus Ponens and N a is easily seen to be algebraizable [BP89, FJP03] , in fact an instance of what Rasiowa calls an implicative logic [Ras74, Fon06] . More explicitly, the algebraic semantics looks as follows:
• A, ∧, ∨, →, ⊥, ⊤ (the intuitionistic/Heyting reduct of A) is a Heyting algebra and
Moreover, A is a normalized or iA-algebra if its strict reduct is a weakly Heyting algebra [CJ05] , i.e., it satisfies in addition
❍ CK, CD, CT, and CI are called by Celani and Jansana [CJ05] C1 -C4, respectively. Denote the equational class of -algebras by -haes (haes standing for "Heyting Algebra Expansions") and the class of normalized ones by Di-haes.
A valuation v in A as usual maps propositional atoms to elements of A and is inductively extended tov defined on all formulas in the obvious way. Write A, v ϕ if v(ϕ) = ⊤, A ϕ if A, v ϕ for all ϕ, A Λ if A ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Λ, and K ϕ if A ϕ for every A ∈ K. Given any K ⊆ -haes and any set of formulas Λ define
Theorem 3.2 (Algebraic Completeness).
• For any K ⊆ -haes, Th(K) is a logic.
• For any logic Λ, Λ = Th(Mod(Λ)).
Proof. See our companion paper [LV] or apply techniques of abstract algebraic logic (AAL) as discussed in standard references [BP89, FJP03, Ras74, Fon06] . ❑
Kripke Semantics
We briefly recapitulate basic information from our overview [LV18] . A (Lewisian) Kripke frame is a triple F := W, , , where is a partial order on W , ⊆ W × W and furthermore
Admissible valuations then map propositional atoms to -closed sets and intuitionistic connectives are interpreted as usual using . The clause for in a model is
Given such a Kripke frame, it is an easy exercise to define its dual algebra whose Heyting reduct is given as usual by Up (W ), i.e., upsets of W , and the strict reduct (interpretation of ) is induced by (1). The dual algebra is normalized, i.e., the equality CD corresponding to Di holds. In other words, extensions of iA − which are not extensions of iA can only be Kripke sound, but not Kripke complete. A fuller discussion of Di and other principles in the Kripke setting (written without employing explicitly algebraic language) can be found in our paper [LV18] . Definitions of notions such as the finite model property (fmp), i.e., completeness wrt a finite class of frames are standard.
Some modal axioms that we need together with their correspondence conditions are given in Figure 1 . Its fuller version can be found in [LV18, § 6], along with an extended version of the following summary of existing results. Open Question 3.4. Are i-GW and related systems involving W Kripke complete?
-Noetherian (conversely well-founded) and semi-transitive Remark 3.5. There are other semantics for iA − and iA, which are intermediate between algebraic and Kripke ones. We do not treat them here, as our paper is primarily syntactic in nature, but in subsequent work we are going to discuss, e.g., suitable generalizations of so-called Veltman semantics, or semantics merging Kripkean interpretation of intuitionistic connectives with nieghbourhood interpretation of . ❍
Arithmetical Interpretations
Our paper [LV18] proposed a general framework of schematic logics [LV18, § 5.1] for arithmetical interpretations of logical systems, in particular extensions of iA − . It can be also seen as semantics of propositional modal logics and this aspect is our main focus here. Let us present the framework restricted to the -signature.
We restrict ourselves in our presentation to theories extending the intuitionistic version of Elementary Arithmetic in the same language. Intuitionistic Elementary Arithmetic consists of the basic axioms for successor, addition and muliplication plus ∆ 0 -induction, plus an axiom expressing the exponentiation is total over intuitionistic predicate logic. We assume that a Σ 0 1 -formula σ T representing the given axiom set of T is part of the data for T . NB: we thus treat arithmetical theories differently from propositional logics that are given as sets of sentences.
Let a function F that assigns to T an arithmetical formula A T (v 0 , v 1 ) as interpreta-tion of . We note that F operates intensionally on σ T . We write B 0 F,T B 1 for F (T )( B 0 , B 1 ). Here C is the numeral of the Gödel number of C. Suppose f is a mapping from the propositional atoms to arithmetical sentences. We define (ϕ) f F,T as the translation that uses f to interpret atoms, F,T to interpret , and that commutes with the propositional connectives.
We say that ϕ is T -valid w.r.t. F if, for all assignments f of arithmetical sentences to the propositional atoms, we have T ⊢ (ϕ) f F,T . We write Λ F (T ) for the set of modal formulas that are T -valid w.r.t. F . Here are several examples of interpretations fitting in this framework, each of which yields a logic extending iA − .
• The most important one is provided by Λ
• ∆ (T ), i.e., ∆-preservativity for a theory T , where ∆ is a class of sentences. We assume that ∆ is given by an elementary formula, say δ, that arithmetically represents it. We define:
We note that ∆,T is a rather uniform interpretation. There is an arithmetical formula P (v 0 , v 1 , X, Y ) with two free second order variables, such that B 0 ∆,
A minimal assumption on ∆ is that it includes a sentence (equivalent to) ⊤. Let us call such ∆ preservation-suitable. This ensures, in particular, that ϕ defined as ⊤ ϕ still encodes provability. It is most common to fix ∆ as Σ • Classically, preservativity is seen as contraposed form of conservativity, which in turn is classically equivalent to interpretability [Ber90, Sha88, JdJ98, Vis98, AB04] [LV18, C.3]. It is also possible to investigate constructive interpretability logic, although it appears somewhat less well-motivated [LV18, C.4].
• Yet another example of a schematic interpretation is provided by the -translation. That is, is interpreted as ((ϕ ∧ ϕ) → (ψ ∧ ψ)), where is the ordinary provability modality.
• An example of an arithmetical interpretation not fitting well into the schematic framework sketched above is provided by the logic of admissible schemes: i.e., ϕ ψ is valid if whenever an arithmetical instance of ϕ is provable, so is the corresponding instance of ψ. We postpone a detailed discussion to a later work.
Extension Stability
The main focus of our paper is axiomatizing principles yielding explicit fixpoints in the logic Λ F (T ) of an arithmetical theory T (relative to chosen F ). Nevertheless, we have already mentioned that regardless of the interpretation of , Λ F (·) is not necessarily monotone:
. We thus would like to know that when our fixpoint principles hold in Λ F (T ) for a base theory T , they also hold in Λ F (T ′ ) whenever T ′ is, say, a finite extension of T . Otherwise, they would appear rather fickle. Thus, we are led to the notion of extension stability. Apart from being central for our arithmetical (reverse) correspondence theory, it seems to be of interest for ordinary modal model theory; it turns out to be an overlooked generalization of the notion of subframe logic [Fin85, Wol93] . Recall that Löb-like logics, while being in general non-elementary, tend to be subframe, which above classical K4 ensures nice completeness properties. The details are discussed in a companion paper [LV] ; we just recapitulate basics here.
Given ϕ and a fresh propositional variable p, define translation ϕ ⌈p⌉ inductively as commuting with the propositional variables and the connectives of IPC, with the clause being (ψ χ)
As ϕ is ⊤ ϕ, we get iA
A logic Λ is extension stable if, whenever Λ ⊢ ϕ and p not in ϕ, we have Λ ⊢ p → ϕ ⌈p⌉ .
Theorem 5.1 ( [LV] ). Suppose the logic Λ is axiomatized over iA − by Γ (w.r.t. the iA − -rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation) and suppose that, for every ϕ ∈ Γ and p not in ϕ, we have Λ ⊢ p → ϕ ⌈p⌉ . Then Λ is extension stable.
Definition 5.2. We say that F is an elegant interpretation if for any recursively axiomatizable arithmetical theory U and any arithmetical sentences A, B, C, we have that
). For any preservation-suitable ∆, ∆-preservativity is an elegant interpretation.
Theorem 5.4 ([LV]).
Whenever F is an elegant interpretation and U is a recursively axiomatizable theory, S(Λ F (U )) is of the form
, where A is ranging over all arithmetical sentences. Consequently, Λ(U ) is extension stable iff for all A we have
Remark 5.5. We could also build the inverse: consider the ϕ ⌈p⌉ for Λ ⊢ ϕ, where p ∈ var(ϕ), and close off to make it a logic. This gives an extension of Λ.
Interestingly, this construction yields the well-known Kripke proof of Löb's Theorem from Gödel's theorem in the classical case: if we start with iA − plus the excluded middle plus ⊤, we get L . Similarly, we get ( ϕ → ϕ) ϕ from ⊤ ⊥. Regrettably, we need the excluded middle here to get rid of negations that weaken the result constructively. ❍ Example 5.6. The following examples are discussed in the companion paper [LV] . . We will call the scheme that corresponds to the de Jongh-Visser calculation JV, show that it allows deriving L a (hence L a is precisely the logic of this construction) and that the resulting logic is extension stable.
We define iGL by the contraposed operator , we obtain the interpretability logic IL. We note that Di is not valid in contraposed IL. See [Vis90b] and [dJV91] . ❍
We have the symmetric Löb rule:
Lemma 6.2. The rule sLR a is admissible for iGL 
We note that θ can also be written as (ψ p p)χ⊤ or as (ψ χ χ)⊤.
We define the principle JV as follows:
We have seen that iGL − a ⊢ JV. We now show that, conversely, iA − ⊕ JV ⊢ L a , and, hence, iA − ⊕ JV coincides with iGL
Proof. The JV-fixed point of (p → ϕ), where p does not occur in ϕ, is (⊤ → ϕ). This tells us that we, iA − ⊕ JV-verifiably, have L . It follows, by Lemma 2.3, that we have uniqueness of fixed points in iA − ⊕ JV. Now consider the formula (p → ϕ) ϕ, where p does not occur in ϕ. On the one hand, ⊤ is a fixed point of this formula even over iA − . On the other hand, JV gives us ( ϕ → ϕ) ϕ as a fixed point. By uniqueness, we find that ( ϕ → ϕ) ϕ is iA − ⊕ JV-provable. ❑
We note that, in the proof of Theorem 6.4, we used that we are allowed to choose p locally. We summarize Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 in one statement.
Corollary 6.5. iGL − a coincides with iA − ⊕ JV.
We see that it follows from that iA − ⊕ JV is indeed a logic in that it is closed under substitution. This could have been proven, of course, without the detour over the characterization.
Theorem 6.6. iA − ⊕ JV is extension stable.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that iGL − a is extension stable. We leave the verification that iA − is extension stable to the reader. We have:
Clearly,
The right-hand-side of ( †) is an instance of L a . ❑
We end this section by comparing iGL − a to the stronger theory iGLW − . We remind the reader that the principle W can be equivalently written as
We define iGLW Proof. To see that iGLW − extends iGL − a , we note that specializing W by taking ψ := ϕ gives us L a over iA − .
We take ϕ := ⊥ and ψ := ⊥ in iGLW − . This gives us iGLW
JS
We proceed with the study of explicit fixed points in the style of de Jongh and Sambin. We define JS as follows.
The principle JS is prima facie simpler than JV, however, the impression is somewhat misleading. As we will see, over iA − , neither principle implies the other.
We begin with a natural preliminary result:
We remind the reader that the results of applying ⊕ are not automatically closed under substitution.
Proof. Suppose that q is distinct from the variables in ψ and χ and that q is distinct from the substitution variable p. Let ν be given. By possibly renaming the substitution variable p we can arrange that p does not occur in ν. We have:
The result of substitution is again an instance of JS. ❑ Theorem 7.2. iA − ⊕ JS is extension stable.
Proof. Let q be distinct from the variables in ψ and χ and from the substitution variable p.
We have:
The resulting formula is again an instance of JS. ❑
The proof of the following theorem is essentially due to de Jongh and Visser [dJV91] . In the intuitionistic setting, it has been also noted by Iemhoff et al. [IDJZ05] .
Proof. Since iGLW − extends iGL − a , we have JV in iGLW − . Moreover:
Here the first and third equivalences are instances of W and the second equivalence is an instance of the substitution principle Su1, noting that χ⊤ is equivalent to ( χ⊤ ↔ ⊤). ❑ Now consider the principle
We define iGLP
We prove JS in iGLP − . The development here is essentially the one from Smoryński Proof. We reason in iGLP − .
Conversely, suppose (ψ χ)(ψ χ)⊤ and (ψ χ)⊤. From the latter we can derive
Since in (ψ χ)(ψ χ)⊤ the formula (ψ χ)⊤ occurs only modalized, we find: (ψ χ)⊤. By Löb's Rule, we may drop the assumption (ψ χ)⊤. ❑
We end this section by showing some incomparability results.
Lemma 7.5. iGLP 4 a . Consequently, iGLP is not a subtheory of iGL − a .
Proof. If over iGL we define ϕ ψ as (ϕ → ψ) this validates an extension of iGLP. However, 4 a would translate to (ϕ → ϕ), which is obviously not in iGLP, or even in the classical version theoreof; let us recall a trivial proof. We can consider the Kripke model on three different points a, b, c. We take := { a, b , a, c , b, c } and = { a, a , b, b , c, c } (that is, a classical model). Let b p and c p. Then, the model satisfies iGLP but a p p. ❑
In fact, the non-containment goes both ways, i.e., extends to incomparability.
Theorem 7.6. iGLP − is not contained in iGLW (and a fortiori not in iGL a ) .
Proof. One possible argument is via interpretability logic, however this only works for non-containment in iGLW − . 1 Thus, consider the following Kripke frame:
We set that d p and p does not hold anywhere else. This model is easily seen to be supergathering but a does not validate p ⊥ → (p ⊥). ❑ 1 Suppose we extend iGLW − and iGLP − with classical logic, and we add 4a, and we switch to the contraposed reading . We thus obtain, respectively, the interpretability logics ILW and ILP. It is well known that ILP strictly extends ILW. So it follows that iGLP − is not a subtheory of iGLW − . Hence, a fortiori, it is not a subtheory of iGL We note that iGLW
− ⊕JS is contained in the incomparable theories iGLW − and iGLP − , it is strictly contained is both.
Theorem 7.7. The theory iA − ⊕ JS is strictly contained in iGLW − and iGLP − .
Theorem 7.8. iGL − a is incomparable to iA − ⊕ JS.
Proof. iGL − a proves 4 a , but, by Lemma 7.5, iGLP − does not. So, a fortiori, iA − ⊕ JS does not prove 4 a .
By considering the fixed point of p ⊥, we see that iA − ⊕ JS proves ( ⊥ ⊥) → ⊥. However, by Lemma 6.7, iGL − a does not. ❑ Open Question 7.9. Can we give an interesting characterization of iA − ⊕ JS? E.g. can we derive it from finitely many schematic fixed point equations? Or can we refute that this is possible? In the rest of this paper we will make the question a bit more specific. ❍
The Join of JV and JS
What happens if we add an axiom that says that the JV-fixed point of ψ χ is equal to the JS-fixed point?
Consider the scheme:
Proof. Consider the formula (p → ϕ) ψ, where p does not occur in ϕ and ψ. The JV-fixed point of (p → ϕ) ψ is ( ψ → ϕ) ψ and the JS-fixed point is modulo iA − -provable equivalence ϕ ψ. ❑ Corollary 8.2. The following theories are equal: iA − ⊕ JV ⊕ JS, iA − ⊕ X and iGLW − .
Proof. Since iA − ⊕ JV ⊕ JS extends iGL − , we have uniqueness of fixed points and hence X. Moreover, iA − ⊕ X ⊢ W. Finally, we have already seen that iGLW − proves JS and JV. ❑ JV (ψ χ⊤ χ⊤) ↔ (ψ χ)(ψ χ⊤ χ⊤) the de Jongh-Visser scheme of explicit fixpoints iGLW
the de Jongh-Sambin scheme of explicit fixpoints
the most powerful consequence of JS we know
a principle holding both under JS and JV In this section, we contribute to approach (iii), by computing four salient JS-fixed points.
The Principle W *
The JS-fixed point of (p → ϕ) ψ is modulo iA − -provable equivalence ϕ ψ. The fixed point equation is (ϕ ψ) ↔ (((ϕ ψ) → ϕ) ψ). Modulo iA − -provable equivalence this equation simplifies to the principle W * :
Here is a first insight about W * .
Theorem 9.1. Over iA ⊕ CPC, the principle W * axiomatizes the same logic as 4 .
Proof. Over iA ⊕ CPC, ϕ ψ collapses to (ϕ → ψ). See [LV18, Lemma 4.6]. This tells us that over iA ⊕ CPC the principle W * reduces to:
Putting ϕ := ¬ χ and ψ := ⊥, ( †) gives us classically 4 , i.e., χ → χ. Conversely, we easily get ( †) from 4 . ❑
9.2 The Principle W
•
The JS-fixed point of (p∧ϕ) ψ is modulo iA − -provable equivalence ϕ ψ. The fixed point equation is (ϕ ψ) ↔ ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ ψ)) ψ). Modulo iA − -provable equivalence this equation simplifies to the principle W
• :
We note that, if we put ϕ := ⊤ in W • , we get ( ψ ψ) → ψ. This last, by iA − -reasoning, implies L . 
By putting ϕ := ⊤ we find L modulo iA-provable equivalence. Conversely, it is easily seen that ( †) is iA-provably equivalent to an instance of L . ❑
Proof. We work in iA − ⊕ L ⊕ W * . Let β := (ϕ ∧ (ϕ ψ)). We want to show that we have (β ψ) → (ϕ ψ). Assume (a) ((β ψ) → (ϕ ψ)) We apply W * with β in the role of ϕ and ψ in the role of ψ obtaining:
By (a) we have:
From (c) it is immediate that (β ψ) → (ϕ ψ). Finally, we apply Löb's Rule and we are done. ❑ Theorem 9.5. iA
Proof. We work in iA − ⊕ W • . We will use that we have L in this theory. Let α := (ϕ ψ) → ϕ. We want to show that (ϕ ψ) → (α ψ). Assume (a) ((ϕ ψ) → (α ψ)) We apply W
• with α in the role of ϕ and ψ in the role of ψ obtaining:
From (c) it is immediate that (ϕ ψ) → (α ψ). Finally, we apply Löb's Rule and we are done. ❑
We define iGLW
We have already shown:
We also have:
Proof. Since iGLW •− is contained in iGLP − , it cannot contain iGL − a . Conversely, putting ϕ := ⊤ and ψ := ⊥, we see that iGLW
•− ⊢ ( ⊥ ⊥) → ⊥. But by Lemma 6.7, the logic iGL − a does not prove this. ❑
The Principle L
• a
The JS-fixed point of ϕ (p → ψ), where p does not occur in ϕ and ψ is, modulo iA − -provable equivalence, ϕ ψ. The fixed point equation is: (ϕ ψ) ↔ (ϕ ((ϕ ψ) → ψ)). Modulo iA − -provable equivalence this reduces to:
We note that putting ϕ := ⊤ in L
• a gives us precisely L . We define iGL
Proof. In iGLW •− we have:
The Principle 4
The JS-fixed point of ϕ (p ∧ ψ), where p does not occur in ϕ and ψ is, modulo iA − -provable equivalence, ϕ ψ. The fixed point equation is
Over iA − this simplifies to the following principle:
• a gives us precisely 4 . Theorem 9.9. iGL
Proof. We reason in iGL
We find the desired result by applying Löb's Rule. ❑
We note that we can interpret the unimodal Löb system in iGL
•− a by reading ϕ (·) for the box.
Proof. The strictness follows from the fact that iGL
•− a is contained in the incomparable theories iGLW
•− and iGL 
Correspondence and Non-conservativity
We can now extend the list of known correspondences given in Theorem 3.3 and Figure  1 to several additional principles, whose importance has been highlighted by our study.
Theorem 10.1. In Kripke semantics, P corresponds to the transitivity of .
Proof. Clearly transitivity implies P. Conversely, consider a frame F with nodes a b c and a c. We define x p iff c x, and x q iff x c. Clearly, c p and c q, so a (p q). On the other hand, consider any z with a z p. It follows that c z. By our assumption z = c, so z c. Ergo z q. Thus, a p q. ❑ Theorem 10.2. In Kripke semantics, 4
• a corresponds to gather-transitivity: if x y z, then x z or y z.
Proof. Suppose F is gather-transitive. Consider any model on F . Suppose a ϕ ψ. Suppose we have a b c and b ϕ and c ϕ. In case a c, we have c ψ and in case b c we also have c ψ. Done.
Conversely, consider a frame F with a b c and (i) a c and (ii) b c. We define x p iff b x or c x, and x q iff x c. Clearly, b ⊢ p and c p and c q, so a (p q). On the other hand, consider any z with a z p. It follows that b z or c z. In case we would have z c, it follows that either b c or z = c. The first possibility is excluded by (ii). The second possibility is excluded since it would follow that a c contradicting (i). Ergo, z c and, so, z q. Thus, a p q. ❑
In the presence of Di, we also have
Proof. We reason in iA ⊕ 4
• a . First, 4
• a gives us that ϕ (ψ χ) → ϕ (ϕ (ψ χ)).
On the other hand, it also yields that ϕ (ψ χ) → ϕ (ψ (ψ χ)).
Now use Di to derive
ϕ (ψ χ) → ϕ ((ϕ ∨ ψ) (ψ χ)).
. . . and now we use 4
• a again:
→ ϕ (ψ (ϕ (ψ χ))). ❑ Nevertheless, the above derivation crucially uses Di. It is a cautionary tale that the Kripke correspondence conditions lose some of their importance for extensions of iA − which do not extend iA. Some key fact about the definition of are:
• For every a = ⊤, ⊤ a = ⊥;
• a 3 a 2 = ⊥;
• a 5 ⊥ = a 5 a 3 = a 4 a 3 = a 4 ;
• a 2 ⊥ = a 2 a 3 = a 5 ;
• a 2 a 4 = a 2 a 5 = a 2 .
Note that via a 4 a 3 and a 2 a 3 one can disprove Di. ❑
Explicit Fixpoints and the Beth Property
It has been shown first by Maximova [Mak89] that explicit fixpoints yield the Beth definability property and subsequent literature provides further investigation of this phenomenon [AHdJ98, Hoo01] . For constructive -logics, this argument has already been made by Iemhoff et al. [IDJZ05, § 4.3] . Hence, we simply state as an observation that any logic which extends either iA − ⊕ JS or i-GL a = iA − ⊕ JV enjoys this property.
Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has studied the surprisingly complex first stage of construction of guarded fixpoints: for formulas whose principal connective is itself. Even its restricted scope has left some questions unanswered. In follow-up work, we will investigate the question of how to extend the definability result from a restricted class of formulas to a wider one, including the computational cost of such extensions; syntactic setup necessary for that purpose (inspired by and generalizing that of [dJV91] ; the issue of commuting resulting fixpoints operators with substitutions has intriguing Beck-Chevalley aspects) would distract too much from the main goal of the present paper. In particular, we have mentioned that classically, it is possible to use elimination of guarded fixpoints for elimination of positive fixpoints of ordinary µ-calculus [VB06, Vis05] . Furthermore, is possible to define a portmanteau notion of semipositive formulas (where every occurrence of p is either guarded or positive), which in general allow explicit locally minimal fixpoints [Vis05] . It is possible to generalize such results to the intuitionistic setting, but the techniques and results involved are more demanding.
[ 
formulas(goals).
(x + (y + z))^(x + (y + (x + (y + z)))) = x + (y + z). end of list.
formulas(mace4_clauses). x^(y^z) = (x^y)^z. x^x = x. x^y = y^x. x^1 = x. x^0 = 0. x * x = 1. x^(x * y) = x^y. x^(y * x) = x. x * (y^z) = (x * y)^(x * z). 
